Yaqeen Blog

As of January 21, 2026, the world’s eyes are on Dhaka. In exactly 22 days, on February 12, 2026, Bangladesh will hold its first national election since the 2024 Monsoon Revolution. For the diplomatic community, this is not just a vote; it is a Hard Reset for the country’s stability. However, beneath the promise of democracy lies a serious threat of violence. Current intel suggests that the weeks surrounding the election will be the most dangerous period in the country's recent history.

1. The Volatility Index: Why February 12th is a Powder Keg

The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus, is attempting a transition while the former ruling party, the Awami League (AL), remains officially barred from the contest. This has created a massive political vacuum that rival factions are desperate to fill.

The Rejectionist Front

The Awami League has officially rejected the February 12th date, calling it illegal. Supporters of the deposed regime have vowed to block the polls. This creates a high risk of "street-level" battles between loyalists of the old regime and the newer political forces like the National Citizen Party (NCP).

The Assassination Spike

Violence has already claimed high-profile victims. In mid-December 2025, prominent youth leader Osman Hadi was shot in Dhaka. His death, which occurred in a Singapore hospital on December 18, triggered a wave of national mourning and riots. The fact that the Dhaka Metropolitan Police identified suspects as active members of the former ruling party has only deepened the anger on the streets.

Anti-India Sentiment

Tensions with New Delhi are at an all-time high. Following the death of Osman Hadi, protests targeted Indian diplomatic missions in Chattogram and Rajshahi. The situation has become so grave that just yesterday, January 20, 2026, the Indian government began a precautionary evacuation of the families and dependents of its diplomats from the High Commission in Dhaka and other assistant missions.

2. The Islamist Factor: Sleeper Cells and the "Shadow" Alliance

There is significant concern regarding the resurgence of Islamist extremist groups like Ansar al-Islam and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Intelligence reports suggest these groups are exploiting the current security vacuum to reorganize.

The "Looted Arms" Threat

During the 2024 revolution, over 5,750 firearms and nearly 652,000 rounds of ammunition were looted from police stations. While elite units like the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) have recovered some pieces—including recent seizures in Cumilla—over 5,000 military-grade weapons remain missing. On January 20, the Chief Adviser himself ordered that these weapons must be recovered "by any means" before the election. These arms are almost certainly in the hands of "sleeper cells" or political militias.

The Deposed Regime’s Wildcard

There is credible suspicion that elements of the deposed regime may be providing financial support to these radical cells. The goal is to cause enough "havoc" to prove that the current government cannot maintain order, thereby making the election results look invalid to the international community.

3. The Likelihood of Violence: A Three-Phase Forecast

The Pre-Election Phase (Now until February 11)

The risk is considered Extreme. Campaigning officially begins tomorrow, January 22. We expect to see bombings of polling centers, arson targeting media houses, and widespread "Hartals" (strikes). The "Inqilab Mancha" and other radical groups have already threatened to march on diplomatic zones.

Election Day (February 12)

The risk is Severe. Experts anticipate "booth jamming" and digital blackouts. There is a high probability of localized lynchings and clashes between the student-led "July Oikya Mancho" and armed groups intent on stopping the vote.

The Post-Election Phase (February 13 – March 2026)

The risk remains Extreme. If the election proceeds without the Awami League, their supporters may launch a long-term insurgency. Conversely, if the results are seen as rigged by the remaining parties like the BNP, the streets of Dhaka could see a repeat of the 2024 violence.

4. Strategic Advice for Diplomats and Government Officials

The Hard Reset in Bangladesh is fragile. If the election fails due to violence, the country risks sliding into a long-term "Grey Zone" of instability.

• De-Risk Personnel: Follow the Indian lead. Ensure non-essential staff and dependents are out of the country before the heavy campaigning begins this week.

• Monitor the July Charter: The election is happening alongside a referendum on the July Charter (constitutional reform). Any violence targeted at this referendum is a direct attack on the new legal foundation of the country.

• Watch the Military: The Bangladesh Army is currently the only stabilizing force. Their ability to recover the looted weapons in the next 20 days will be the biggest indicator of whether February 12th will be a democratic milestone or a bloody disaster.

The Essence:

Violence is not just a possibility; it is highly probable. The combination of thousands of missing military weapons, resurgent sleeper cells, and a deposed regime with nothing to lose creates a perfect storm for February 2026.